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STUDENT NOTES
a constitutional and vested right." A Wisconsin statute on the
question of damages provides that in the exercise of eminent do-
main by the state in the case of streets or highways, damages and
benefits shall be allowed and the excess of one over the other shall
be stated. 5 Construed in a recent case,8 6 it was held to cover
benefits accruing to the general public as well as benefits resulting
specially to land taken.
In the later statutes and decisions is manifested a trend toward
the policy of considering all benefits in the determination of dam-
ages in these cases. This trend, as previously indicated, is nurtured
in the present policy of the state in trying to bring down excessive
costs of rights-of-way so as to make the money appropriated for
roads and other public improvements go as far as possible. Also
there has grown up a changed concept of the sacred character of
real property ownership which might tend to alter the basic theory
of "just compensation" in condemnation cases. But whatever the
basis of the present policy may be, this problem is a very real and
practical one; and it is unfortunate that our cases on this question
decided since the 1933 amendment to our eminent domain statutes
have failed to take cognizance of the change. It is submitted that,
in view of the evident legislative intent back of the statute, the
strong policy of today favorable to public improvement, and the
recent trend in other jurisdictions on the question as previously
shown, the present West Virginia statute should receive an in-
terpretation in all cases involving damage to property which per-
mits the deduction of both general and special benefits from the
aggregate damage suffered by the property.
D. R. K.
STATUTORY LARCENY IN WEST VIRGINIA
Larceny by Embezzlement. There being no embezzlement at
common law, statutes have been enacted to rectify certain defects
or "loopholes" existing in the law of larceny, so as to apply to the
fraudulent conversion of money or property otherwise not reached
by the common law. A clear understanding of the statute, "strictly
construed", 1 is necessray since embezzlement is generally regarded
as a separate and distinct crime, although commission of the offense
constitutes larceny.
35 Wis. STATS. (1935) C. 32, § 32.10 (1).
36 Nowaczyk v. Marathon County, 205 Wis. 536, 238 W. W. 383 (1931).
1 State v. Cantor, 93 W. Va. 238, 116 S. E. 396 (1923).
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The embezzlement statute,2 "among other things, declares it to
be larceny for any agent, servant, etc., of any person to embezzle
or fraudulently convert to his own use any effects or property of
any other person which shall have come into his possession by vir-
tue of his place or employment.'' 3
Under this statute in order to constitute the crime of em-
bezzlement it is necessary to show: (1) the trust relation of the
defendant, and that he falls within the class of persons named; (2)
that the property or thing claimed to have been converted is such
property as is embraced in the statute; (3) that it is the property
of another person; (4) that the defendant received possession, care
or management of it by virtue of his office, place or employment;
(5) that his manner of dealing with or disposing of the property
constituted a fraudulent conversion and an appropriation of the
same to his own use; and, (6) that the conversion of the property
to his own use was with the intent to deprive the owner thereof.4
The interpretation of the statute will be considered under the topics
of these six various elements.
1. The triyst relation of the defendant, and his being within
t7e class of persons named in the statute.' There is sufficient trust
relation shown where the defendant is a contracting agent of the
county and is given custody of cement for storage, the same having
been purchased by the county court." An assistant of the Red
Cross organization intrusted with flour for storage and distribu-
tion,7 and a commissioner of the county court who embezzles county
funds8 are embraced in the terms of the statute. Also included
within this class is an insurance agent who collects the premiums
on policies sold.9
One who is intrusted with a check to collect and account for
to another is guilty of embezzlement if he converts it; and this is
2 W. VA. RzV. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 61, art. 3, § 20.
3 State v. Moyer, 58 W. Va. 146, 52 S. E. 30 (1905).
4 State v. Workman, 91 W. Va. 771, 114 S. E. 276 (1922) quoting from State
v. Moyer, supra, note 3.
51( .... any officer, agent, clerk or servant of this State, or of any county,
district, school district, or municipal corporation, or of any banking institution,
or other corporation, or any officer of public trust in this State, or any agent,
clerk or servant of any firm or person, or company or association of persons not
incorporated .... 1" W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 61, art. 3, § 20.
0 State v. LaRue, 98 W. Va. 677, 128 S. E. 116 (1925).
7 State v. Holley, 115 W. Va. 464, 177 S. E. 302 (1934).
8 State v. Workman, 91 W. Va. 771, 114 S. E. 276 (1905).
O State v. Moyer, 58 W. Va. 146, 52 S. E. 30 (1905). He was not entitled to
his commissions until the premiums were first turned over to the company in
cash. (Reversed on other grounds.)
2
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so, even if it is but a single transaction, there being no necessity of
having the trust relation, previously established; and the same
holds true even if no compensation is received for making the col-
lection. 0 In State v. Cantor, where money was delivered to de-
fendant to indemnify him for going on another's trial bond, which
was to be returned by him to the owner after the trial, the
count of embezzlement for failure to return the money was not up-
held because of the lack of any allegation showing the purpose for
which the money was intrusted, the trust relation of defendant to
the depositor, and the office, place or employment of the defendant
in accordance with the statute.1 However, the defendant might be
found guilty of larceny, since this state has accepted the somewhat
anomalous doctrine that under a common law indictment for
larceny one may be convicted of that offense by evidence of em.
bezzlement.1 2
2. The property or thing claimed to have been converted being
such property as is embraced in the statute,1 3 and (3) being the
property of another person. This has been held to include money
collected as premiums by an insurance agent when the premiums
were first to be paid over to the company before the agent was en-
titled to his commissions.14 A cheek drawn on a bank, though not
specifically covered by the statute, is within the meaning of the
word "property"" and a fortiori funds of a bank would also be in-
eludeds even without the express term "money" which appears
in the statute.
A county order for money is a security for money, a debt owing
10 State v. Fraley, 71 W. Va. 100, 76 S. E. 134 (1912). Of extrinsic interest
is the rule that an attorney and client relationship begins when the client ex-
presses a desire to employ the attorney, and the attorney has given his consent
to act. This was held to be applicable in the principal case to indicate when
the trust relation arose.
1193 W. Va. 238, 116 S. E. 396 (1923). The fact that the defendant gave
a receipt in the name of a tailoring company which he owned, and entered the
amount on the company's books does not show any agency or trust relation,
or place or employment.
12 State v. DeBerry, 75 W. Va. 632, 84 S. E. 508 (1915); State v. Workman,
91 W. Va. 771, 114 S. B. 276 (1922). In the Cantor case, in reaffirming this
proposition, the court said " .... I have grave doubts as to the correctness of
the holding .... ", at 245. For cases contra to the West Virginia rule see
20 0. J. § 56.
13"* .... bullion, money, bank notes, drafts, security for money, or any other
effects or property of another person .... " W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937)
c. 61, art. 3, § 20.
14 State v. Moyer, 58 W. Va. 146, 52 S. E. 30 (1905).
15 State v. Fraley, 71 W. Va. 100, 76 S. E. 134 (1912).
16 State v. Wetzel, 75 W. Va. 7, 83 S. E. 68 (1914).
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the county, and is within the statute." Under a former statute
relating to embezzlement of bank property'" which has now been
included in the present embezzlement statute, the word "money"
has been construed to refer to "the currency or circulating medium
of the country."1°
Cement belonging to the county,20 flour belonging to the Red
Cross,21 fees and collections of a county clerk which are the proper-
ty of the county and state,22 and rugs intrusted to a defendant by
an agent of a corporation to be cleaneds fall within the statute.
4. The receiving of possession, care or management of the
property by virtue of his office, place or employment. Collecting
money as premiums by an agent of an insurance company,24 re-
ceiving rugs under a contract to clean them,25 or handling credits
and funds as cashier of a bank28 satisfy the requirements of this
element. Likewise one who receives cement for storage which he
has sold to the county,27 an agent of the Red Cross organization,
who receives flour and has the duty of distributing it,28 and a
county clerk who collects fees by virtue of his office,29 are included.
It is possible to commit embezzlement without coming into
actual possession of the property. In the case of State v. Work-
man"0 county commissioners voted to purchase land for the county
at a sum higher than the true price and agreed to divide up the
difference. The fact that they did not come into actual possession
of the money was held not to preclude their having control by
virtue of their offices when they constituted the vendor of the land
their agent to cash the court order and pay over to them their re-
spective "shares".
17 State v. Workman, 91 NV. Va. 771, 114 S. B. 276 (1922).
18 W. Va. Acts 1913 (Hogg, 1913) c. 54, § 81a XVI.
1O State v. Hudson, 93 W. Va. 435, 117 S. E. 122 (1923). This definition
did not include funds and credits of a bank, and if these latter items were not
properly described and identified there could be no conviction of embezzle-
ment of moneys. To obviate this result when the property is not sufficiently
described, the present statute specifically, states that it is not necessary to
describe or identify the property embezzled. W. VA. REV. CoDE (Michie, 1937)
c. 61, art. 3, § 20.
20 State v. LaRue, 98 W. Va. 677, 128 S. E. 116 (1925).
21 State v. Holley, 115 W. Va. 464, 177 S. E. 302 (1934).
22 State v. Smith, 117 W. Va. 598, 186 S. E. 621 (1936).
23 State v. DeBerry, 75 W. Va. 632, 84 S. E. 508 (1915).
24 State v. Moyer, 58 W. Va. 146, 52 S. B. 30 (1905).
25 State v. DeBerry, 75 W. Va. 632, 84 S. B. 508 (1915).
20 State v. Wetzel, 75 W. Va. 7, 83 S. B. 68 (1912).
27 State v. LaRue, 98 W. Va. 677, 128 S. E. 116 (1925).
28 State v. Holley, 115 W. Va. 464, 177 S. E. 302 (1934).
20 State v. Smith, 117 W. Va. 598, 186 S. B. 621 (1936).
20 91 W. Va. 771, 114 S. E. 276 (1922).
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Merely intrusting property for a single transaction without
any prior agency relation, is a sufficient agency or employment
within the meaning of the statute, as where one receives a check
for which he is made agent for collection."1 But where one is tem-
porarily intrusted with money to indemnify him for going on a
trial bond this does not in itself show that he received the money
by virtue of any office, place or employment.32
5. The defendant's manner of dealing with or disposing of the
property constitutes a fraudulent conversion and an appropriation
of the same to his own use. As to what constitutes a conversion
there is no little controversy. The West Virginia courts" recognizes
as the most comprehensive and accurate definition the one appear-
ing in Black's Law Dictionary: "An unauthorized assumption and
exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels
belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the ex-
clusion of the owner's right."
An attempted disposal of goods intrusted to one's care, which
is ineffective, may not amount to a conversion within the meaning
of the statute. A defendant was given rugs to clean to be delivered
back the next morning, and his attempt to sell them being unsuc-
cessful, he stored them in a stable but was arrested that evening.
Under his contract of cleaning he had no duty to redeliver them
to the owner till the following morning and conviction for em-
bezzlement was therefore reversed.
4
Although the rule is frequently so stated, it is not necessary
that the defendant appropriate to his own personal use or advan-
tage. In the Cantor case, the fact that the defendant turned over
the money to his tailoring company which used and controlled it
exclusively, would not relieve the defendant if he himself was
without right to appropriate it.83
In State v. Holley,"3 the defendant assisted in the distribution
of Red Cross flour to the needy, and some had been stored in a room
on his premises. Suspected of using some of it for his own pur-
poses, a search was made, and over defendant's denial that he had
any flour, several sacks were found secreted behind a separate
compartment, blocked off 'with building paper, with no door or
other means of access thereto. As to the question of conversion, the
31 State v. Fraley, 71 W. Va. 100, 76 S. E. 134 (1912).
32 State v. Cantor, 93 W. Va. 238, 116 S. E. 396 (1923).
33 State v. DeBerry, 75 W. Va. 632, 636-637, 84 S. E. 508 (1915).
84 I.dem.
33 State v. Cantor, 93 W. Va. 238, 249, 116 S. E. 396 (1923).
36 115 W. Va. 464, 117 S. E. 302 (1934).
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court, quoting from State v. DeBerry 7 the definition set forth in
Black's Law Dictionary, held that setting the goods aside and
secreting them apart from the usual place of the owner's storage,
amounted to a conversion.
That embezzlement may be committed without the defendant's
ever coming into possession of the property was shown in the Work-
man case. The vote of the commissioners to appropriate the money
which could not otherwise be paid out, was the fraudulent con-
version and appropriation to their own use, apparently as soon
thereafter as their agent received the money for them, the in-
tent to deprive the county thereof being manifest at the time of
the voting.
6. The intent being to deprive the owner thereof. That the
conversion be fraudulently and feloniously done, is a very neces-
sary element, and an instruction to the jury which omits this con-
stitutes reversible error.38 There need be only a general intent or
purpose to do the act in violation of the statute. In State v. La-
Rue,39 cement belonging to the county court was placed in de-
fendant's custody, who sold much of it to other persons, without
accounting to the county court for the proceeds. It was a clear case
of embezzlement, there being little doubt of a complete conversion
with the intent to deprive the county thereof.
The gist of the offense is the fraudulent intent to make an
absolute appropriation, not merely a design to deprive the owner
temporarily. A mere detention of another's money without a
fraudulent intent to convert it to one's own use does not constitute
embezzlement, for there may exist the intention to repay or re-
store it.40
As a general rule the intent need not exist at the time the
defendant received the property, but could occur subsequently at
the time of the conversion.4' However, where a defendant was
given a check for collection, and was indicted for conversion of the
check, the court stated that defendant would be guilty of the em-
bezzlement of the check itself and also the money received for it if
37 75 W. Va. 632, 84 S. E. 508 (1915).
38 State v. Smith, 117 W. Va. 598, 186 S. E. 621 (1936). At D 's request, A
handed him nine $50.00 bills so D could demonstrate a trick. D put the bills in
a black trick box, and A later found it contained no money. D was appre-
hended after going to a neighbor's house, and he turned over the bills to a
justice. D was convicted of grand larceny, but not on the theory of embezzle-
ment because of the faulty instruction mentioned.
30 State v. LaRue, 98 W. Va. 677, 128 S. E. 116 (1925).
40 State v. Moyer, 58 W. Va. 146, 52 S. E. 30 (1905).
42 State v, DeBerry, 75 W, Va, 632, 84 S. R. 508 (1915).
6
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he had the intent to obtain the proceeds at the time he received the
check. But it would seem that this is more properly a case of
larceny by triclk42
The fraudulent intent may be inferred from defendant's con-
duct.4 3 When the president and chairman of the board of directors
of a bank obtained money by drawing checks on false credits in his
favor created by issuing checks on another bank without deposits
to meet them, it was held that the circumstances warranted a find-
ing of fraudulent intent on the part of the defendant."4 In the
Holley case, in considering whether the conversion of the flour was
with the intent to deprive the owner of the property, the court said
that the allegation that a person fraudutlently did a certain thing is
equivalent to a charge that the thing was done with intent to de-
fraud. Defendant's concealment of the flour, coupled with his
falsehoods in attempting to keep the officers from finding it, "justi-
fies the conclusion that the same had been fraudulently converted
to his own use." 4
5
Obtaining property by false pretenses. Such an offense is com-
pleted where both title and possession of property are obtained by
false pretenses with intent to defraud, and the property is de-
livered with the intention on the part of its owner of parting with
it altogether.4 This is a purely statutory offense, constituting
larceny in West Virginia.47
42 State v. Fraley, 71 W. Va. 100, 76 S. E. 134 (1912). D pretended he was
a lodge brother and professed other friendship, inducing A to give him a check
to collect.
43 State v. Wetzel, 75 W. Va. 7, 83 S. E. 68 (1912). As whore a defendant
cashier of a bank furnished false and invalid notes to the commissioner of
banking tending to cover up his unlawful appropriations.
44 State v. Frantz, 108 W. Va. 639, 152 S. E. 326 (1930). Frantz v. State
of West Virginia, 281 U. S. 767, 50 S. Ct. 465, 74 L. Ed. 1174 (1929) writ of
certiorari denied.
45 State v. Holley, 115 W. Va. 464, 177 S. E. 302 (1934). Defendant
predicated a defense on the basis that merely setting the goods aside from the
owner's place of storage was to be distinguished as an intent to effect a future
conversion. The court replied that while concealing alone may or may not
amount to a conversion, "concealment with intent to convert the property to
one's own use does amount to a fraudulent conversion thereof." (P. 468).
In other words, the court is prone to apply the rule laid down in State v.
Moyer, 58 W. Va. 146, 151, 52 S. E. 30 (1905), that great latitude is per-
mitted in proving or disproving the element of intent in embezzlement cases.
"State v. Edwards, 51 W. Va. 220, 41 S. E. 429 (1902). D and X had en-
ticed A into a card game playing for money, and D and X pretended that A
and D had jointly won from X $2000. As a condition precedent to receiving
the money, D pretended to put up $1700, inducing A to put up $300 to total
an amount equal to X's $2000, and the $4000 was then put into a tin box, prior
to dividing it between A and D. Later A was given the tin box to kceep the
money, until D should come to A's house and make the division. A later dis-
covered there was no money in the box. Held, larceny by trick, and not ob-
7
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Under the statute it is necessary to allege and prove the fol-
lowing essential elements: (1) intent to defraud; (2) actual fraud;
(3) false pretenses used to accomplish the object; and, (4) that
the fraud was accomplished by means of the pretense made use of,
that is, it must be in some degree the cause, if not the control-
ling cause, which induced the owner to part with his property.4
"With intent to defraud" appears in the statute, and such in-
tent must be present in the mind of the defendant at the time he
obtained the property, 9 for the intent is the gravaman of the of-
fense8 ° The court has placed-a restricted meaning on these broad
taining money by false pretenses. A had put the money into the box for a
special and limited purpose, to add it to D's $1700 as a condition precedent
to an equal division by A and D, and A parted only with possession when D, by
artifice, extracted the money from the box. See Note (1940) 46 W. VA. L. Q.
246, 250, n. 43, for further discussion of this ease, and the distinction drawn
between false pretense and larceny by trick.
47 W. VA. REV. CODE, (Michie, 1937) c. 61, art. 3, § 24. A violation of only
the first provision of this section is declared to be larceny.
48 State v. Pishner, 72 W. Va. 603, 78 S. B. 752 (1913), citing Anable v.
Commonwealth, 24 Gratt. 563 (Va. 1873) and State v. Hurst, 11 W. Va. 54
(1877).
.... If the representation made is false, if the declaration is that a cer-
tain condition exists or does not exist, and the contrary is true, and by reason
of this declaration another parts with his goods, and the purpose of the party
making it was to defraud, the requirements of the law are met, and the party
so obtaining the goods is guilty of the charge of obtaining goods by false
pretenses." Sudnick v. Kohn, 81 W. ra. 492, 495, 94 S. E. 962 (1918).
49 State v. Smith, 97 W. Va. 313, 125 S. B. 90 (1924). See note 38, supra,
for the facts of this case. There could be no conviction under false pretenses
section because of a defective instruction which omitted the element of present
intent to commit the crime when the money was obtained.
In State v. Paulian, 120 W. Va. 265, 197 S. B. 728 (1938) D purchased three
gallons of gasoline from A, and gave A a twenty dollar bill, whereupon A gave
D three $5.00 bills, four $1.00 bills, and forty-three cents change. On D's re-
questing a five dollar bill instead of five $1.00 bills, A gave D a five dollar bill,
which D put with two other five dollar bills and five $1.00 bills, the total of
which he gave back to A, requesting that A give D back the twenty dollar bill
in exchange therefore. A, "thereupon becoming confused by said transac-
tions", gave D the twenty dollar, bill, accepting from D the five dollar bill
which A had just handed D, and the five $1.00 bills which D had originally re-
quested to exchange for the five dollar bill, along with two other $5.00 bills,
and then D walked away without giving A the five $1.00 bills for the five dollar
bill A had given D. The court admitted evidence of a previous transaction of
the same day whereby D secured $5.00 in like manner, as evidence for the jury
in ascertaining D's criminal intent. Conviction of obtaining a five dollar bill
by false pretenses affirmed.
Go State v. McGinnis, 116 W. Va. 473, 181 S. E. 820 (1935). Although this
case arose under the "Worthless Check Act" it is applicable here since the
same phrase appears in both sections, which are similar in nature. See notes 59
and 60, infra.
In State v. Cobb, 7 S. E. (2d) 443 (W. Va. 1940) D, an assistant county school
superintendent, represented to A, a high school superintendent, that his school
and others were to turn over certain funds monthly to the board of education,
whereby A gave D a check for $77, the money belonging to the school, but was
8
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words of intent, depending on the nature of the case involved.
For example, "A man cannot be held guilty of procuring money
by false pretenses, with intent to defraud, who has merely collected
a debt justly due him, though in making the collection he has used
false pretenses."' 1 Apparently, in such cases, there would be no
intent to defraud.
In certain factual situations it becomes difficult to determine
if false representations have been made, and to ascertain the precise
matter which is the basis of the false pretenses 2 False representa-
tions may be made by acts or conduct as well as by words."8
mingled with A's own funds. Conviction for larceny by obtaining goods by
false pretenses reversed for failure to instruct that D must have had the
present intent to commit the offense at the time (of. note 49, supra). By way
of dictum the opinion stated that prearrangement and knowledge by both A
and B would not be tantamount to a felonious intent. Id. at 445.
51 State v. Hurst, 11 W. Va. 54 (1877). For consideration A had assigned a
bond for $144.39 to the wife of D, A promising to pay it if B, the obligor,
defaulted. Representing there was $158.00 due on it, D exchanged it with A for
that amount. It was contended that since A had promised to pay if B defaulted,
A was under a legal obligation to pay the $144.39, and all that was obtained by
false pretenses was the amount he did pay, $148.00 less the amount he was
bound to pay, $144.39, or $13.61, which being less than $20, could not be a
felony. Reversed because of the failure of the lower court to so instruct.
In the case of State v. Williams, 68 W. Va. 86, 69 S. E. 474 (1910), repro-
senting that he was an agent for B, a butcher, D offered to buy A s cow for
$27.50, and A accompanied D and the cow to town to get the money. Instead
of paying cash, however, D presented A with a judgment against A for $50
assigned to D by X. The judgment was just, but A refused to deal on that
basis, and later regained possession of the cow by a detinue bond. D's con-
viction of obtaining the cow by false pretenses reversed on the grounds that it
is no offense to obtain property upon the pretense of buying it for cash, for the
purpose of the payment of a just debt equal to or greater in amount than the
price of the property. Id. syl. 2.
This seems opposed to the weight of authority. See Note (1911) 32 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 420, where a distinction is made between (1) a creditor's inducing one
by false pretenses to pay a debt knowing that he is paying it, in which case he
is not defrauded although induced by false pretenses, and (2) inducing the
owner by false pretenses to part with his property or money for some other
purpose, with the secret intent on the part of the creditor of applying it on a
debt, in which case, he is in fact defrauded of his property by the fraudulent
application of it to a purpose other than the one he contemplated.
In the principal case the court stated that there was no doubt that D re-
ceived possession by means of false pretenses, i. e., representing that he would
pay cash for the cow. Of. State v. Augustine, 114 W. Va. 143, 171 S. E. 111
(1933), note 53, infra.
52 In State v. Cutlip, 78 W. Va. 239, 88 S. E. 829 (1916) Ds, husband and
wife, borrowed $632.50 from A and gave a note for that amount. Shortly after
A's death, a paper signed by Ds was found concealed in A's bed, which paper
purported to be a contract of sale by Ds to A of realty for $632.50. Ds wore
indicted on the theory that they prepared this paper after A's death, unlaw-
fully and fraudulently pretending to have entered into a contract, by means
of which false pretenses they attempted to obtain the note from A's estate.
Unfortunately for present purposes, the merits of the case were not reviewed
9
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The giving of a worthless check, or one which the defendant
had no reason to suppose will be honored, is in itself a false pre-
tense, the giving of the check being a representation that the de-
fendant has money or credit with the drawee to the amount of its
face value. 4 This amounts to a representation of a present ability
to meet the obligation represented thereby, without which the de-
frauded person would not have relinquished his title, i.e., he must
be induced to part with his property relying on the false pre-
tenses.°
since a demurrer was sustained, necessitating a reversal for defective allegation
of ownership.
On January 25, 1939, in payment for gasoline, D gave A a check dated
"January 28", apparently post-dated, but actually dated "1938" instead
of "11939" which both D and A failed to notice. The check was dishonored
and A had D arrested, and he was indicted for obtaining property by false
pretenses on the theory that the check was a forgery, whereas D represented it
as a valid check. Conviction was reversed because of a faulty instruction
which presumed the forgery, and also failed to instruct as to D's fraudulent
intent. State v. Laskey, 7 S. B. (2d) 439 (W. Va. 1940).
G3 State v. Augustine, 114 W. Va. 143, 171 S. B. 111 (1933). Under a con-
tract of sale of cattle, D, buyer, paid $50 down and promised to pay cash for
the balance on the delivery day. On that day A and D met and drove the
cattle out to where they commingled with other cattle of D, nothing being said
about payment, A presuming D would "settle-up" afterwards. D gave A two
checks, requesting that presentment be delayed, and when they were later pro-
tested, D gave notes for the checks and thereafter became insolvent, having
sold the cattle. At no time from the day of issue did D have enough money to
cover the checks. The court held that A contemplated a cash sale, and D, by
his -silence, indicated he was ready, willing and able to pay, and the cattle were
given into his custody only on conditional delivery, title not vesting in D until
ho issued the checks. A accepted the checks in lieu of the represented cash
settlement.
G4 State v. Augustine, 114 W. Va. 143, 171 S. E. 111 (1933). It means that
the existing state of facts is such that in ordinary course the check will be met.
The fact that payment is deferred does not change the representation to a future
event, a promise to pay in the future, or a mere extension of credit.
55 In State v. Martin, 103 W. Va. 446, 137 S. B. 885 (1927), D received a
draft through the mail payable to "R. L. Martin", which happened to be D's
name, but obviously intended for "R. T. Martin" as evidenced on the face
of the draft. It had been issued in payment for certain railroad ties and in
endorsing it over to A for $47.10, D, as an attempted explanation, falsely
represented that he was running a saw mill and had been delivering ties on
the railroad, and that the 'draft was sent to him by X, a debtor of D. The
court held that since A parted with the title as well as the possession of the
money and the jury found that D's pretenses were false, then the latter was
guilty of obtaining property by false pretenses.
If the false pretenses are of such a character that they could not have in-
duced one to part with his money, there could be no reliance on the repre-
sentation. State v. Hurst, 11 W. Va. 54 (1877).
Where a defendant was indicted under the "Worthless Check Act" (see
notes 59 and 60, infra) the court said "There is no offense, unless the money
or property obtained was parted with in reliance upon the false representation
made by the check or draft . . . . If the vendor or lender relies upon the
financial ability of the other party and not upon the representation of funds
10
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Selling stolen property, knowing it to be stolen, is obtaining
property by false pretenses. "The law would presume, that a per-
son, having in his possession property which he knew to be stolen
property, had no authority to trade or sell it.' '" The false pre-
tense is representing that he had such authority. Although the
West Virginia statute does not state "knowingly by", which words
are found in the statutes of some of the other states, the element
of scienter must be present and alleged, i.e., that the defendant
knew that his pretenses or representations were false."
It is no defense that the false pretenses were such as would not
have deceived an ordinary person of average intelligence, although
the rule may have been otherwise at the early common law. "The
law is as much for the protection of those ignorant and illiterate
and full of credence as for the protection of the astute and in-
credulous. ""
in the bank, the transaction involves no criminal offense." State v. Cunning-
ham, 90 W. Va. 806, 810, 111 S. E. 835 (1922).
55 State v. Halida, 28 W. Va. 499, 504 (1886). D had stolen a colt and made
an even trade of it with A for the latter's "dun mule" worth $75. The ques-
tion arose whether it had been properly alleged that D, knowing the colt was
stolen, had the scienter, i. e., knowledge that his representation was false; since
"The scienter or knowledge is the essential element by which the act or pro-
tense is to be judged and characterized." Id. at 503.
57 State v. Hurst, 11 W. Va. 54, 61 (1877). See the facts in note 51, supra.
Where D took an option on real estate from A, sold the property for a profit
to BT representing that there were no heirs, when in fact there were heirs with
outstanding claims, of which D knew, the court thought that it was D's plan
and design to induce B to part with his money by reason of the false repre-
sentations as to the state of the title of the land. State v. Lilley, 112 W. Va.
231, 164 S. E. 242 (1932). The fact that B's attorney examined the title did
not preclude B's reliance on D's misrepresentations, since D had answered in
the negative to the direct question, Are there any heirs?. And though the
check in payment was made out to A, who indorsed over to D, this was no
defense, in the opinion of the court, since D's nodus operandi is of only
secondary importance.
5s Sudnick v. Kohn, 81 W. Va. 492, 94 S. E. 962 (1918). A, a merchant,
sold goods to D, on the latter's representation that he was now married, and
would pay in full or substantial part the next payday. D later refused to pay,
and denied having received the goods, which he had turned over to a woman
with whom he was boarding. A had D indicted for obtaining goods by false
pretenses, but the lower court ruled that D's representations as a matter of law
were not a probable cause for reliance by A, and excluded evidence of these mat-
ters. D then sued A for malicious prosecution, and A claimed actual reliance
by him on D's statement of his marriage on the basis that married men are more
settled and better credit risks. Held, it is error for the court to exclude evi-
dence of B's representations which are for the jury. Reversed and remanded
for a new trial.
Early authorities held that the false pretenses must be such as would de-
ceive one of average or ordinary capacity, but "It seems to be held with prac-
tical unanimity at this day that there is no such requirement.11 I. at 495.
11
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Violation of the "Worthless Check Act"5 9 is a type of false
pretense which, in this state, does not constitute larceny by statute.
But as previously indicated, under the false pretense statute "one
way be indicted and convicted of obtaining money or property by
means of a false and fraudulent check given therefor, accompanied
with the necessary knowledge and animo furandi."60
Under the "worthless check" section, the issuance of a check
on a bank in payment of a pre-existing debt, by one who has in-
sufficient funds in the bank to pay the check is not an offense,6 '
and presumably it would be no crime under the false pretense sec-
tion.62
The type of property which may be subject to being obtained
by false pretenses includes "money or goods or other property
which may be the subject of larceny.'"'" Does this refer only to
goods subject to larceny at common law, or as extended by various
statutes? In State v. Hurst,6' the court adopted the latter con-
struction, at least inferentially, by stating that certain bank notes
and treasury notes (not subject to larceny at common law) 5 "be-
ing now a subject of larceny" fall within the statute.6
The property may be obtained from the actual or constructive
possession of the true owner, and the general rules relative to pos-
session in larceny are applicable to false pretenses.67
Since violation of only the first provision of the false pretense
section constitutes larceny, under the former statute the penalty
set forth68 was construed to apply only to the remaining provisions,
59 'W. VA. REV. CoDn (Alichie, 1937) c. 61, art. 3, § 39.
60 State v. Pishner, 72 W. Va. 603, at 604, 78 S. E. 752 (1913). Speaking of
the statute before the 1931 revision the court said that the object in passing
the " IWorthless Check Act" was to constitute the making, issuance, and delivery
of a check, and thereby obtaining credit, money or goods of another, a crime
regardless of the intent or knowledge of the maker of the condition of his
account, and to burden him with the duty of knowing the fact, before issuing
a check; but relieving him from the offense which under the false pretenses
section he would not be, if he pay the amount within the time prescribed by
statute. The 1931 revision added "with intent to defraud". See State v. Mc-
Ginnis, 116 W. Va. 473, 181 S. E. 820 (1935), note 50, supra.
Cl State v. Pislmer, 72 W. Va. 603, 78 S. E. 752 (1913).
02 See note 51, supra.
03W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 61, art. 3, § 24.
04 11 W. Va. 54 (1877).
O5 Regina v. Watts, 6 Cox Cr. Cases 304 (1854).
06 For goods subject to larceny see Note (1940) 46 W. VA. L. Q. 246.
67 State v. Cobb, 7 S. E. (2d) 443 (W. Va. 1940). See Note (1940) 46 W. VA.
L. Q. 246, 250.
68 Confinement in the penitentiary from one to five years, or, in the discretion
of the court, confinement in jail for not more than one year and a fine not ex-
ceeding five hundred dollars.
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and since "obtaining money under false pretenses, is by this statute
made larceny", then "the penalty of the offense is the same as in
other cases of larceny."6  The wording of the statute has since
been changed to apply the penalty to "any of the provisions of this
section"7 and the particular punishment attaches to the offense
regardless of the value of the property.71
Receiving Stolen Goods. *Whether this amounted to a crime
at common law, distinct in itself, has been greatly disputed by the
authorities,7 2 but in West Virginia today receiving stolen goods
knowing them to have been stolen, or having reason to believe such,
is an offense which by statute constitutes larceny.7
8
Under the statute the offense is comprised of the following
elements: "1st. That the goods or other things were previously
stolen by some other person. 2nd. That the accused bought or re-
ceived them from another person, or aided in concealing them. 3rd.
That at the time he so bought or received, or aided in concealing
them, he knew they had been stolen.7 4  4th. That he so bought or
received them, or aided in concealing them, malo animo, or with a
dishonest purpose. ' 7
Not only must there be a receiving or concealing of stolen
goods, but by the words of the statute peculiar to the Virginias
only, it must be proved and alleged that the goods had been re-
ceived "from another person' ".71 And there must be some con-
69 State v. Hurst, 11 W. Va. 54 (1877).
70 W. VA. REv. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 61, art. 3, § 24.
71 State v. Grove, 74 W. Va. 702, 82 S. E. 1019 (1914). D was convicted of
obtaining property by false pretenses and since the goods were valued under
$20 the question arose collaterally with another issue whether he was guilty of
a felony under the statute or whether the ordinary larceny statute applied, thus
making the offense only a misdemeanor. Cf. the penalty for ordinary larceny
[W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 61, art. 3, § 13] which is not applicable in
false pretenses cases. State v. Martin, 103 W. Va. 446, 137 S. E. 885 (1927).
72 The West Virginia court categorically states that it does in State v. Wal-
lace, 118 W. Va. 127, 189 S. E. 104 (1936), citing other local cases. See
MmLER, CumiNAL LAw (1934) § 125 which states that such a conclusion is
doubtful; that at most it may have been a substantive misdemeanor.
73 W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 61, art. 3, § 18. On an indictment for
larceny, conviction may be sustained by proof of receiving stolen property.
State v. Halida, 28 W. Va. 499 (1886) ; State v. Wallace, 118 W. Va. 127, 189
S. E. 104 (1936).
74 Since the 1931 revision of the code, W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 61,
art. 3, § 18, this element has been broadened to include "having reason to
believe" the goods were stolen.
75 State v. Smith, 98 W. Va. 185, 126 S. E. 703 (1925) citing Hey v. Com-
monwealth, 32 Gratt. 946 (Va. 1879).
76 This means that it must be shown from whom the goods were received, or
that they were received from persons to the grand jury unknown. State v.
Smith, 98 W. Va. 185, 126 S. E. 703 (1925).
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nection between the defendant and the thief of the goods, since
the statute contemplates two persons: (1) the original thief or a
successor in criminal possession of the stolen goods,77 and (2) a
person to whom that possession is transferred. "The mere dis-
covery and appropriation of stolen goods by a person does not con-
stitute this statutory crime."s7
Of the four elements in this offense the one presenting the
most difficulty is the question of scienter. Under the former statute
a defendant could be convicted only if he knew the goods were
stolen, but since 1931, having reason to believe such, is sufficient.79
This knowledge must have existed at the time the goods are re-
ceived, 0 but if the offense charged is merely concealing the goods,
then knowledge subsequent to the actual receiving of the goods, fol-
lowed by a concealing may be proved to convict of the crime.8'
Scienter often is, of necessity, sustained only by circumstantial
evidence, which must satisfy a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, 2
and cannot rest on mere supposition, 3 but can be proved by suf-
77 There is a split of authority regarding the guilt of a defendant who has
received the stolen goods from another who guiltily received them from the
thief. MnILEa, CRn=AL LAw (1934) 398.
78 State v. Fowler, 117 W. Va. 761, 188 S. E. 137 (1936). A car had been
wrecked and abandoned in a field and D bad stripped it of all removable parts.
Conviction of knowingly receiving stolen parts of an automobile reversed.
78 State v. Lewis, 117 W. Va. 670, 187 S. E. 315 and 728, 188 S. E. 473 (1936).
See Note (1937) 43 W. VA. L. Q. 232 for a detailed analysis of this case, in-
eluding interpretations of "knowing" and "'having reason to believe."
80 State v. Hill, 52 W. Va. 296, 43 S. B. 160 (1902).
81 State v. Manstoff, 118 W. Va. 214, 189 S. E. 698 (1937).
82State v. Bushman, 79 W. V. 747, 91 S. E. 809 (1917). D was indicted for
buying and receiving pieces of brass stolen from a railroad. The court ad-
mitted evidence that brass of this kind was bought and sold by all junk dealers
in the open market as a factor bearing on D's good faith or knowledge on his
part that the property was stolen.
83 State v. Mounts, 120 W. Va. 661, 200 S. E. 53 (1938). X had stolen
packets of cigarettes and made various sales of them to D at half the retail
price, stating they had been given to him. X testified as to newspaper accounts
of his various burglaries. Conviction for receiving stolen goods reversed for
lack of sufficient evidence of knowledge that the goods were stolen. Although
inadequacy of the amount paid for the goods is part of the circumstantial evi-
dence tending to give notice of the stolen character, it is not in itself con-
trolling. Id. at 665.
"The possession of stolen property, alone, is not sufficient to convict the
accused of knowledge of its theft; but such possession may, with all other evi-
dence and circumstances in the case, be considered by the jury.") State v.
Manstoff, 118 W. Va. 214, 189 S. B. 698 (1937). Pieces of meat stolen from
X were found six weeks later in D's storeroom. D failed to make any satis-
factory explanation of his acquisition and possession of the stolen property
other than he had purchased it. He was convicted of concealing stolen goods.
14
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ficient facts which are suspiciously incriminating, "tending to show
guilty knowledge." 84
Indicative of the strict proof requirement of the scienter under
the present statute, is the holding that where one is engaged in
legitimate business, "It must be shown that actual knowledge had
been brought home to him that the seller of the article was the
thief or that the property had been stolen."8 15 It is not clear
whether the court also meant to imply that where the defendant
is engaging in illegal business there is less presumption of his inno-
ence.
Obviously once the crime of receiving stolen goods has been
completed, an immediate return of the goods, or restitution, is no
defense; but on the other hand, a voluntary tender at the time of
apprehension, along with mitigating circumstances may tend to
show either lack of the required guilty intent, or lack of scienterY's
Larceny by Embezzlement by a Carrier. The wording of this
statute7 applies to "any carrier or other person to whom . . .
property ... may be delivered to be carried for hire, or ... any
84 State v. Hill, 52 W. Va. 296, 304, 43 S. B. 160 (1902). Goods stolen
from a freight car were later found in D's possession who explained that two
men had asked him to deliver the goods to another town. Held, the fact that D
took the goods to another place by night, hid them in a cowshed, gave a false
account as to the contents of the boxes in which the goods -were contained, and
tried to conceal the true point from which he had come, and other evidence
tended to show scienter. Conviction of receiving stolen goods affirmed.
In State v. Wainwright, 119 W. Va. 34, 192 S. E. 121 (1937) D received
goods directly from the men who had stolen them in Virginia. D, having never
seen them before, questioned them closely, when they acted suspiciously. They
had brought the goods in a suit case and sack to him at night, expressly
telling him the goods were "hot". Held, evidence sufficient to convict in view
of the strongly suspicious circumstances admitted by D himself, along with the
direct testimony of the state.
The Wainwright case arose under section 19 of the statute being considered,
wherein receiving goods stolen in another state is made larceny. The rules and
principles applicable to receiving stolen goods apply likewise to section 19,
except for the statutory innovation of 1931 mentioned in note 74, supra.
85 State v. Wallace, 118 W. Va. 127, 189 S. E. 104 (1936) (italics supplied).
D, a licensed pawnbroker, purchased a valuable ring for $4.00 from X, who had
stolen it. D failed to produce the ring when officers gave him an inadequate
description of it, but later turned it over to the police, and identified the thief.
Conviction of larceny by receiving 'or concealing stolen goods reversed for
insufficient evidence.
86 State v. Goldstrohm, 84 W. Va. 129, 99 S. E. 248 (1919). D had purchased
and received from two boys who had burglarized a residence, a valuable
lorgnette, chain and revolver. Held, it was error for the trial court to reject
evidence that D had certain conversations with the arresting officer which would
tend to explain D's method of acquiring the property. D had a right to show
his voluntary tender to the officer which is to be considered with statements he
made at that time.
s7 W. VA. REv. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 61, art. 3, § 21.
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other person who may be intrusted with such property...." By
the interpretation set forth in State v. Cantor,8 the only case found
where it has been construed, this section applies "only to one to
whom property is intrusted to be carried and delivered to another
person."
Larceny by Embezzlement by a Fiduciary. The more impor-
tant part of this statute"8 declares it to be the offense of larceny
for any guardian, personal representative, or other fiduciary to
wilfully fail to return an inventory of personal property (if re-
quired by law), or to conceal or embezzle such property. No ad-
judicated cases construing this statute have been found.
J. S. M.
88 93 W. Va. 238, 243, 116 S. E. 396 (1923).
so W. VA. RE v. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 61, art. 3, § 23.
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